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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ALLOCATING RADIO FREQUENCIES BETWEEN COMMON
CARRIERS AND PRIVATE USERS: THE
MICROWAVE PROBLEM*
IN deciding how to control the use of newly developed forms of radio com-
munication, the Federal Communications Commission is called upon to choose
between apparently conflicting philosophies of regulation embodied in the
Communications Act of 1934.' The FCC controls the utilization of the radio
spectrum by dividing it into bands of varying width, allocating each band to
a different type of radio service, and awarding specific frequencies within each
band to individual applicants.2 In exercising this control, the Commission is
governed by the rather vague standard of "public convenience, interest, or
necessity." 3 The Communications Act suggests two ways to implement this
standard. Title III, "Provisions Relating to Radio," 4 suggests that the FCC
is to act primarily as a traffic manager, allocating frequencies, awarding li-
censes, and controlling interference, and conveys at least an implicit congres-
sional mandate to maintain a condition of ordered competition within the field
of radio communication.5 In contrast, Title II, "Common Carriers," (I seems
*Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 mc., Report and Order, 27 F.C.C.
359, 18 P. & F. RADIO REG. 1767 (1959) [hereinafter .cited as 1959 Microwave Report] ;
Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 mc., Memorandum Opinion and Order,
29 F.C.C. 825 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 1960 M1icrowave Opinion].
1. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1958).
2. 48 Stat. 1082 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1958). Section 305(a) exempts
frequencies occupied by government services, which are assigned by the President. 48 Stat.
1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 305 (1958). The power of the President to withdraw frequencies
from the Commission's control has been sustained. Bendix Aviation Corp. v. FCC, 272 F.2d
533 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub nom. Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. United States, 361
U.S. 965 (1960).
3. 48 Stat. 1082, 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307, 309 (1958). The
standard is not, however, so vague as to be unconstitutional. NBC v. 'United States, 319
U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) ; Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285
(1933).
4. 48 Stat. 1081 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-29 (1958).
5. See §§ 311, 313, 314 of the Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1086-87 (1934), as amended,
47 U.S.C. §§ 311, 313, 314 (1958) ; FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474
(1940) ; Mansfield Journal .o, v..FCC, t,8.0 E.2d, 28, 33 .(I.C. £ir. 1950) ; Southeastern
Enterprises, 13 P. & F. RADlO REG. 139, 146 (1957); Uniform Policy on Violations of Laws,
(pt. 3), 1 P. & F. RADIo REG. 91:495, 500 (1951) ; Celler, Antitrust Problems in the Tele-
vision Broadcasting Industry, 22 LAw & CONTEM.P. PRoB. 549, 551 (1957) ; Hale & Hale,
Competition or Control II: Radio and Television Broadcasting, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 585,
620 (1959). But see FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 91 (1953) ; Carroll
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
6. 48 Stat. 1070 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-22 (1958).
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to contemplate that at least some uses of radio will be developed by large,
closely regulated concerns. A communications common carrier is a firm which
"holds itself out or makes a public offering to provide facilities by wire or
radio [to] all members of the public." 7 With regard to these enterprises, the
FCC is viewed as a much more powerful instrument, exerting control over
rates, the adequacy of existing services, and the extension of new facilities.,
As a corollary of such regulation, the Commission is expected to protect the
common carrier from competition. 9
The Communications Act contains different approaches because it is actu-
ally an amalgam of parts taken from two earlier acts. Both titles were incor-
porated into the 1934 Act without substantial change because each provided
a regulatory program adapted to the peculiar needs of a specific industry.
Jurisdiction over communications common carriers, primarily the telephone
and telegraph companies, was at first exercised by the Interstate Commerce
Commission.10 Because physical and economic limitations restrict the number
of firms that can engage in communications common carriage, and because the
duty to provide adequate service is often inconsistent with maximization of
profits, these companies were regarded as public utilities and were regulated
and protected accordingly.' At the time of the 1934 Act, Congress expressed
concern at the growing dominance of a few firms and attempted to intensify
7. Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Laramie Community TV Co., 16 P. & F. RADIo REG.
1005, 1008 (1958); see CATV Systems and Auxiliary Television Systems, 18 P. & F.
RADIO REG. 1573, 1603-04 (1959). A communications common carrier may provide only a
specified type of service without losing its status as a common carrier. See Teleprompter
Corp., 13 P. & F. RADIO REG. 111 (1955); Allocation of Frequencies for Theatre Television
Service, 9 P. & F. RADIO REG. 1528 (1953). Similarly, private line service (or private radio
service) when provided by a firm engaged in communications common carriage has always
been treated as a common carrier service. CATV Systems, supra, at 1604.
Broadcasting is a separate subject. "'Broadcasting' means the dissemination of radio
communications intended to be received by the public" and is distinct from both "common
carrier" and private radio operations. 48 Stat. 1066 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 153(o)
(1958). A message not directed to the public at large does not come within the definition of
broadcasting. Scroggin & Co. Bank, 1 F.C.C. 194, 196 (1935) ; Adelaide Lillian Carrell,
7 F.C.C. 219, 222 (1939).
8. Communications Act, §§ 201-05, 214, 48 Stat. 1070 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§8 210-05, 214 (1958).
9. See FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953) ; Mackay Radio & Tel.
Co. v. FCC, 97 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1938) ; Western Union Tel. Co., 6 P. & F. RADIO REG.
1157 (1952); EDE.LMAN, THE LICENSING OF RADIO SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1927
TO 1947, 10 (1950). Compare Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173
(1959) ; McLean Trucking Co. y. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 85 (1944),
10. 78 CONG. REc. 8822-23, 10313 (1934). The telephone'and telegraph companies are
still the dominant communications common carriers. See, e.g., 1960 Microwave Opinion
827 n.1, 850-51.
11. See WILcox, PUBLIC POLICIES TowARD BUSINESS 497-99, 594-601 (1955) ; EDEL-
MAN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 9-10; S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ; 78 CONG.
REc. 10315 (1934).
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existing governmental regulation.' 2 The situation was radically different in
the radio broadcasting field. By 1927, there were so many transmitters operat-
ing on the very few frequencies which the industry was then technologically
capable of utilizing that the result was chaos.' 3 Regulation was essential if the
radio signals of one transmitter were to be free of destructive interference from
other signals. The Congress therefore adopted the Radio Act of 1927 14 which
was subsequently lifted almost verbatim into Title III of the Communications
Act.15 There was also a great fear that without governmental control, the
public interest would soon be subordinated to monopolistic domination in the
radio field.16 Therefore, the tone of this title is in favor of the preservation of
an ordered competition.
As long as radio communications and common carrier transmissions remained
relatively separable industries, administration of these different standards did
not prove difficult.17 But as the nonbroadcast, nonentertainment functions of
radio multiply 'I and communications common carriers increasingly utilize
radio in the performance of their services,' 9 the Commission will be called on
more often to reconcile the diverse approaches of Titles II and III.
12. 78 CONG. REc. 10315 (1934). At that time, American Telephone and Telegraph had
95% of the telephone business, while Western Union and Postal Telegraph had 99% of the
telegraph market. Ibid.
13. See EDELmAx, op. cit. supra note 9, at 1-5; Segal & Warner, "Ownership" of Broad-
casting "Frequencies": A Review, 19 RocKY MT. L. REv. 111, 119 (1947).
14. 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), repealed by 48 Stat. 1102 (1934).
15. See 78 CONG. REc. 10987 (1934).
16. See, e.g., 67 CoxG. Rac. 5478-504 (1926) ; FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,
309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940) ; Uniform Policy on Violations of Laws, supra note 5, at 91:499-
500.
17. Ordinarily, the FCC simply allocates certain bands for specified kinds of service in
which common carriers and noncommon carriers do not compete. In one proceeding the
Commission said that what must be considered in achieving the objectives of Title II could
not be considered in achieving the objectives of Title III. In a footnote, it added: "Possible
questions with respect to competition between common carrier operation, and private opera-
tion, in radio communication are not herein involved and are reserved for consideration when
they are appropriately before the Commission." Southeastern Enterprises, supra note 5, at
149 & n.8.
In only one other situation was the Commission faced by a similar policy conflict. The
question was whether a carrier's charges for a lease-maintenance arrangement with private
users of mobile radio service are subject to the approval of the Commission under Title II
of the act. (A lease-maintenance arrangement is one where a private licensee leases his
equipment from a common carrier who also is responsible for its maintenance.) The Com-
mission posed the problem, but left it unanswered; the necessity of answering it was removed
when the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. withdrew the tariff in question. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 15 P. & F. RADio R G. 189 (1957); see Leland G. Smith, 16 P. & F. RADIO
REG. 494c (1958) ; American Tel. & Tel. Co., 15 P. & F. RADIO REG. 196i (1959).
18. See, e.g., FCC Rules § 2.104, 47 C.F.R. § 2.104 (1958) (Frequency Allocation
Table) ; id. § 11.501, 47 C.F.R. § 11.501 (Supp. 1960) (list of those eligible to hold licenses
in Special Industrial Radio Service) ; EDFLUAN, op. Cit. supra note 9, at 186-206.
19. See 1959 Microwave Report 1771-72. At present over 10Y2 million (22%) of the
long distance telephone circuit miles, and 60,000 (78%) of the intercity television circuit
[Vol. 70:954
1MICROWAVE
A recent investigatory proceeding entitled Allocation of Frequencies in the
Bands Above 890 31C. 20 presented the FCC with an opportunity to examine
the relationships between Title II and Title III. The proceeding was concerned
with the Commission's policies in regard to the allocation of frequencies in the
upper reaches of the usable radio spectrum. These frequencies, which begin at
about 890 mc., are known as the microwave bands. Microwave radio is coveted
by many current and would-be users of radio for it possesses certain desirable
characteristics not present in the lower frequencies. A microwave radio beam
may be analogized to a flashlight beam; it can be directed to any selected spot
within range of the transmitter. This straight-line directivity permits the same
frequency channel to be used by parallel systems, each transmitting its own
messages without interference from the other. Microwave radio systems are
not affected in the same way by weather and man-made interference as are
radio services operating on lower frequencies, and are more economical than
comparable wire line systems.
21
One facet of the investigation concerned the policy toward private use of
point-to-point microwave systems.22 Prior to this proceeding, the Commis-
sion's policy was to license only common carriers to use microwave, on a de-
velopmental basis. 23 A few exceptions were made in favor of public safety
bodies and specially designated businesses such as railroads, 24 but otherwise
miles of the Bell system are provided by microwave radio. Brief of American Telephone &
Telegraph Company, pp. 3, 1-10, 1959 Microwave Report. "It is no exaggeration to say that
microwave radio has become indispensable to the rendition by the common carriers of the
high-quality, economical communications services the people of this country have a right to
expect." Id. at 2.
Some carriers use microwave exclusively. See CATV Systems, sopra note 7, at 1604-05;
Montana Microwave Co., 16 P. & F. RADIO REG. 736a, 736d (1958) ; Intermountain Micro-
wave, 16 P. & F. RADIo REG. 733 (1958).
20. 1959 Microwave Report. The purpose of this proceeding was to investigate and
formulate Commission policy. It did not, by itself, change the Commission's Rules, nor did
it award any licenses or frequencies. For the policies enunciated as a result of this study to
take effect, it will be necessary for the Commission to take rule-maldng action. See id. at
1785. These procedures have already begun. See Private Microwave System Standards, 20
P. & F. RADio REG. 1515, 1524a (1960). Authority to conduct such an investigation is given
to the FCC by §§ 154(i), -(j), 303 of the Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1082 (1934), as
amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i),-(j), 303 (1958).
21. Interview with Mr. Fred King, Chief Engineer, WELl, in New Haven, Connecti-
cut, Feb. 9, 1961; Microwaves, The New Workhorse of Radio, Radio & TV News, Apr.
1957, p. 12.
22. Data was collected with respect to 19 specified issues, including, for example, such
things as present and future demands for microwave frequencies (Issue 1), interference
problems in regard to microwave frequency assignment (Issue 3), and requirements of the
radio navigation service for spectrum space above 890 mc (Issue 13). 1959 Microwave
Report 1769, 1771, 1778, 1783.
23. See FCC Rule § 21.700, 47 C.F.R. § 21.700 (1958) (Domestic Public Radio Ser-
vice). This limited station authorizations to "existing and proposed communication com-
mon carriers."
24. See 1959 Microwave Report 1769-70; Brief on Issues 6-9, Motorola, Inc., pp. 1-4,
1959 Microwave Report.
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businesses desiring microwave systems were required to obtain service from
common carriers, in much the same way that they obtain telephone service.2 5
During the twelve years that had elapsed since the Commission last studied
these bands, the microwave frequencies had passed from a developmental, ex-
perimental stage to a usable, economically practical part of the radio spec-
trum.26 The communications common carriers opposed liberalization of point-
to-point licensing. They argued that, under Title II, there was a duty upon the
Commission to protect them from loss, and that competition from privately
owned systems would injure their profit position. They also argued that de-
velopment of microwave systems by common carriers would produce the most
efficient and complete use of such frequencies and that carrier development was
therefore most beneficial to the public interest. Those who desired to obtain
private point-to-point microwave licenses, on the other hand, contended that
since it was the award of private radio licenses that was under consideration,
the competitive model of Title III should govern
7
After an exhaustive investigation,2 8 the Commission concluded in its Re-
port and Order of August 1959, that the eligibility requirements for licenses
of point-to-point microwave systems ought to be relaxed.2 9 This was regarded
as a defeat for the communications common carriers. 30 The Commission re-
affirmed this opinion after a rehearing in September 1960,31 and a Petition
25. Interview with Mr. Fred King, Chief Engineer, WELl, in New Haven, Conn.,
Feb. 9, 1961; cf. Southern New England Tel. Co., Mobile Telephone Service Customer's
Manual (no date). Although the operator of a point-to-point microwave radio would have
to be licensed, according to the regulations the operator need have no special training and
there is no examination requirement---or any requirement other than the application-for
a restricted radio-telephone operator's license. 47 C.F.R. §§ 11.154, 13.11(b), 13.22(g)
(1958).
In practice, however, awards were made to noncommon carriers, but only if common
carrier facilities were not available or the type of service sought did not lend itself to a
common carrier operation. Manufacturers Radio Serv., 10 P. & F. RADIo REG. 157, 159
(1954) ; cf. Television Intercity Relay Stations, 17 P. & F. RADio R G. 1621 (1958).
26. See 1959 Microwave Report 1769, 1771-76; 1960 Microwave Opinion 848-49.
27. For discussion of these arguments, see text at notes 33-37, 46-52 infra.
28. "In all, there were 30 days of oral hearing, over 200 persons and organizations filed
comments, and over 160 persons appeared at the hearing and presented oral testimony. Five
thousand and thirty pages of hearing record were accumulated in addition to 166 exhibits."
1959 Microwave Report 1769.
29. Id. at 1788-89. For example, no longer will it be necessary for the prospective
licensee of a private point-to-point microwave system to show that common carrier service
is unavailable. Id. at 1788.
30. See Messages by Tele-Satellite, Business Week, July 16, 1960, p. 32.
31. Upon rehearing, the Commission reopened the record for the limited purpose of
obtaining information as to frequency needs for space communications. 1960 Microwave
Opinion 827.
In the 1959 Report and Order the Commission found that the independent telephone
companies generally permitted unrestricted interconnection of private microwave systems
with their systems. 1959 Microwave Report 1787. This was not an accurate conclusion
and was therefore modified, but it did not affect the basic determinations of the original
[Vol. 70: 954
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for Review was filed by the American Rocket Society in the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia.3
2
On its face, much of the Commission's decision turns on factual issues rather
than on an explicit choice between the different approaches of Title II and
Title III. Yet in making these findings, the Commission seemed to be guided
by certain assumptions which reflect a strong bias in favor of the regulatory
scheme of Title III.
Part of the potential conflict between Titles II and III was resolved by
finding that private point-to-point systems did not in fact threaten the economic
well being of the common carriers. In raising the spectre of economic hardship,
the carriers sought to invoke the policies underlying Title II protection of
common carriers. This protectionism reflects the national interest in ensuring
that communication services will be available to all, and that such facilities
will be as far reaching and comprehensive as possible. s The need for such
facilities rests not only on their importance to the day-to-day life of the nation,
but also upon their critical importance in times of national emergency.3 4 The
carriers, viewing wire and microwave communications as an integrated system,
had argued that liberal granting of private microwave licenses would take
away a large volume of existing and potential business. Moreover, they con-
tended, those who would establish a private microwave system would be the
larger users of common carrier service. This would mean that the cost of com-
mon carrier service would have to be spread among the smaller users, thereby
increasing the burden upon them, while reducing the quality of service.3 5 The
carriers also pointed out that common carrier rates for microwave systems are
Report and Order. 1960 Microwave Opinion 841. A previously announced policy was also
modified to permit authorization on a case by case basis of intercity educational television
microwave systems. Id. at 842. All other policy and factual determinations of the 1959
Report and Order were affirmed, two Commissioners dissenting on the private licensing
point. Id. at 855.
32. American Rocket Soc'y v. United States & FCC, Petition for Review, Civil
No. 16,094, D.C. Cir., filed December 5, 1960. The American Rocket Society participated
in the proceeding upon the rehearing submitting evidence on frequency needs for space
communications, 1960 Microwave Opinion 827, and seeks judicial review pursuant to §
402(a) of the Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1093 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402(a)
(1958).
33. See Brief of American Telephone and Telegraph Co., pp. 38-46; 1959 Micro-
wave Report 1780. See also FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 93 (1953).
See generally authorities cited note 11 supra.
Section 151 of the Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1958), gives as the purpose of regulation: "[T]o make available, so far- as
possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide
wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges ...."
34. See Communications Act § 151, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 151
(1958) ; 1959 Microwave Report 1779-81.
35. See, e.g., Brief of American Tel. & Tel. Co. pp. 30-37, 1959 Microwave Report;
Testimony of E. T. Lockwood, Ass't Vice President, American Telephone and Telegraph
Co., before the FCC, 1959 Microwave Report.
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uniformly fixed for service within a given jurisdiction for a given distance,
while costs vary. This situation would lead to a "cream-skimming" operation
by private enterprises, they said, whereby the private concern will install its
own system over the portion of the route where costs are low and utilize com-
mon carrier facilities where costs are high. 6 The Commission rejected these
contentions. In part, its decision seeks to answer them by pointing out that
the high costs of private installation will discourage many potential customers
from licensing their own systems, and that the market for common carrier
facilities will increase as the use of microwave becomes more widespread.3 7
But the decision also rejected the carrier's arguments on the grounds that they
were speculative.38 If injury did in fact occur, the opinion stated, the Commis-
sion would be free to reexamine the problem at that time.39
This finding reflects two significant policy decisions. First, the Commis-
sion's effort to determine whether competition in microwave transmission was,
in fact, harmful to the carriers constitutes an implicit rejection of the con-
tention that, as regulated public utilities, common carriers are per se entitled to
protection from competition. Second, the rejection of the carrier's factual argu-
ments as speculative may have important connotations. The entire inquiry into
the effects of microwave competition was speculative; the real issue was not
what would happen, but what risk of injury to common carriers would the
Commission tolerate for the sake of private, noncarrier development. By re-
quiring carriers to adduce convincing proof of threatened injury in this type
of inquiry, the Commission weighted the argument heavily in favor of allow-
ing private licensees.40 The decision might be interpreted, therefore, as an in-
dication that the protectionist policies of Title II are to be strictly construed
36. Testimony of E. T. Lockwood, supra note 35, at 8-20.
37. 1959 Microwave Report 1789; 1960 Microwave Report 850-52.
38. See, e.g., id. at 849-52.
39. We propose to keep constant watch over the development of private services and
the impact of such services upon the operations of the carriers. Should it hereafter
become apparent, based upon experience, that there is a reasonable likelihood that
there will be significant and meaningful adverse effect upon the interests of the pub-
lic, we shall give our further attention to the problem at that time.
1960 Microwave Opinion 852.
The issue might be raised at future licensing proceedings. A common carrier which
would suffer economic injury by the proposed grant of a license is a "party in interest"
entitled to protest in the hearing before the FCC and with standing to seek judicial review
of the Commission's decision. Communications Act, §§ 309, 402, 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as
amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(b), (c), 402(b) (1958); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Sta-
tion, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1940) ; R. J..Laros & Brother, 11 P. & F. RADIo REG. 355
(1954). But cf. Yellow Cab Co., 9 P. & F. RADIO REG. 122a (1953).
40. The carriers argued that the Commission had erroneously shifted the burden of
proof, contending that §§ 303, 307, and 309 of the Communications Act place the burden
of establishing public convenience, interest, or necessity upon the would-be private system
licensee. 1960 Microwave Opinion 829. The Commission replied that the only issue was
whether its conclusions were reasonably supportable. Id. at 854-55. This view seems cor-
rect, since the proceeding itself did not involve the issuance of any licenses.
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when the Commission awards control over newly developed communications
facilities. The extent to which this decision subordinates the policies of Title
II will depend upon the amount of hardship it actually imposes on the car-
riers. While it might be argued that the Commission's freedom to change
its policy minimizes the possibility of actual hardship, reversal of the present
policy at a later time may prove difficult.41 The most likely way to limit the
granting of private licenses in the future would be to refuse issuance of any
new licenses. 42 This "freeze" might create hardships for supply firms which
have invested in development and manufacturing facilities geared to a private
consumer market.43 If a priority system of awarding licenses is adopted con-
currently,44 even existing licensees might lose part of their investment. Private
licensees might be denied renewal of their licenses as new needs for high
priority systems, such as public safety systems, outstrip the limited number of
licenses available.
45
41. The carriers argued that by the time specific data can be obtained, the damage
will be done and it will be too late to save the common carriers. See Petition of the West-
ern Union Tel. Co. for Reconsideration and Rehearing, pp. 6-8. Petition for Reconsidera-
tion of Report and Order, United States Independent Tel. Ass'n, p. 7.
42. This was the approach taken in television allocation. A "freeze" was instituted
by means of a Report and Order, FCC 48-2182, issued Sept. 30, 1948. This provided that
no new or pending applications for television stations would be acted upon by the Com-
mission. The "freeze" lasted until April 1952. Sixth Report and Order, 1 P. & F. RADIo
REG. 91:601 (1952).
43. Although the common carriers have maintained that independent manufacturers
have an equal opportunity to sell equipment to them, see Brief, American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
pp. 55-58, 1959 Microwave Report, Motorola, Inc., itself a manufacturer of microwave equip-
ment, alleged that since A.T. & T. owns a manufacturing subsidiary (Western Electric),
its natural course would be to purchase equipment from its subsidiary. Brief on Issues 6-9,
Motorola, Inc., p. 24,1959 Microwave Report.
The Commission might, however, view this as an antitrust problem not within the
scope of its policy determinations. See United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334 (1959) ; Com-
ment, 57 MicH. L. REv. 885 (1959).
44. Private interests suggested that if there was a shortage of frequencies, a system
of priorities would be desirable. It was generally agreed that the public safety services
should receive top priority. 1959 Microwave Report 1778.
45. Section 307(d) of the Communications Act provides that renewal may be granted
"if the Commission finds that the public interest, convenience, and necessity would be
served thereby." 48 Stat. 1083 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1958). Section
312(a) (2) or § 316 might be interpreted to permit a termination prior to the expiration
of the license if conditions required it. 48 Stat. 1086-87 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§
312(a) (2), 316 (1958).
A crisis in frequency availability, see text at note 50 infra, might-be dealt with by the
President, designating the frequencies needed to be freed for government use under §
305. 48 Stat. 1083 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 305 (1958). See Bendix Aviation
Corp. v. FCC, 272 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub nom. Aeronautical Radio. Inc.
v. United States, 361 U.S. 965 (1960).
Refusal to renew a license in pursuance of the statutory policy is not an unconstitutional
taking of property. Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d
850 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 685 (1932).
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A second policy urged for adopting a Title II approach was also disposed of
by means of a factual finding. The common carriers argued that granting li-
censes only to common carriers results in the most efficient use of the limited
number of radio frequencies available. They urged that to permit private en-
terprises to install their own microwave systems would result in a wasteful
duplication of facilities.40 While the argument did not specify what was meant
by "duplication," several economies in the use of available facilities are pos-
sible. In the first place, limiting licenses to common carriers might result in
microwave systems being used only where the carrier's other facilities, such
as wire communications, were not adequate. 47 This would result in maximum
use of existing facilities and would leave the maximum number of microwave
frequencies open to serve other needs. Another advantage which common
carriers might employ to limit the burden on microwave frequencies is their
superior ability to utilize the same frequency for several customers.48 The
Commission has refused to allow private users to share a common frequency
on a cooperative basis, fearing that the cooperative installations would acquire
the powers of common carriers without being regulated according to the act.
49
As a result, each private user must maintain a separate system, ultimately
causing a greater load on the available number of microwave frequencies. It
was apparently these economics of the Title II approach which led one Com-
missioner to dissent. He argued that there were not enough microwave fre-
quencies available to permit the relaxation of the eligibility requirements,
claiming that frequency demand had always outstripped the supply and that
the imminent development of space communications would impose a potentially
intolerable burden upon an already cluttered spectrum.50 This latter ground is
the basis of the American Rocket Society's Petition for Review.51
46. See, e.g., Testimony of E. T. Lockwood, Ass't Vice-President, American Tel. &
Tel. Co., before the FCC, 1959 Microwave Report; Petition for Reconsideration and Rehear-
ing, p. 15, and Reply of American Telephone & Telegraph Co. to the Oppositions to Petitions
for Reconsideration and Rehearing, p. 12.
47. Assuming wire and microwave radio are interchangable, permitting use of private
microwave radio in an area already served by wire communication might represent an in-
equitable overloading in contradiction to the Act's policy of encouraging an "equitable dis-
tribution" of communications facilities throughout the country. Communications Act §
307(b), 49 Stat. 1475 (1936), 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1958) ; cf. Cohen & Russo, The Anomaly
in Section 307(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, 11 SYRAcusE L. R!v. 202, 203 (1960).
Microwave radio, however, might be regarded as superior to wire as a method of com-
munication, see text at notes 20-21 supra, and thus not in the same classification of com-
munication facilities. The act has been interpreted to require an equitable distribution only
within each class of facility. See Tupelo Broadcasting Co., 12 P. & F. RADIO REG. 1233,
1250 (1956) (television and standard broadcast radio not interchangeable services).
48. The FCC itself recognized this attribute. See 1960 Microwave Opinion 852.
49. 1959 Microwave Report 1786-87.
50. 1960 Microwave Opinion 861. The carriers also maintained that the frequency sup-
ply was inadequate to fill the demand. See, e.g., Reply of American Telephone & Telegraph
Co. to the Oppositions to Petitions for Reconsideration and Rehearing, pp. 19-21.
51. See note 32 supra.
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The Commission's answer to this problem was that it did not, at present,
exist. A majority of Commissioners decided that an adequate number of fre-
quencies are available to handle all presently foreseeable space needs, even if
eligibility requirements for point-to-point microwave systems are relaxed.5 2 This
finding also is quite speculative,5 3 and the Commission again added the caveat
that it was not precluded from reexamining the problem and taking appro-
priate action at a later time.54 As with the finding that common carriers would
not suffer economic hardship, this finding suggests that the Commission is
willing to risk losing the advantages of a Title II approach 5 in order to pro-
mote private licensing of the newly developed techniques.
The decision to relax the eligibility requirements for private point-to-point
microwave licenses was based on more than the negative determination that
the pro-carrier policies would not be adversely affected. The reduction of
control by common carriers was promoted by a view that individual participa-
tion in the industry adds certain desirable features which are not available
under a communications system run entirely by common carriers. The Com-
mission felt that a private enterprise with its own system would have better
control and flexibility for meeting its own hour-by-hour operational and ad-
ministrative needs. It would also be able to set up its own schedule and priority
for maintenance and repair, rather than having to rely on a common carrier.
56
Moreover, a private user which did not require the high quality of service pro-
vided by the carriers would not be forced to pay for such service.
5 7
Another affirmative policy is suggested by the Commission's attitude toward
the threat of competition. The Commission reasoned that the expanded, de-
centralized market for microwave systems would encourage competition in the
manufacture and sale of microwave equipment, and that at least part of this
competition would be in experimentation and development of new equipment.
The decision seems to conclude that a competitive market is a better stimulant
to such development,5 s indicating that the policy in favor of greater competi-
tion may have been required by the statutory obligation to "encourage the
52. 1959 Microwave Report 1785. For the evidence on which this conclusion is based,
see id. at 1770-78. See also 1960 Microwave Opinion 843-48.
53. There was a study conducted by the Electronic Industries Association which sup-
ported the FCC's conclusion. 1959 Microwave Report 1777. American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company took the position that the estimates of EIA were idealistic and impractical.
Ibid. The Commission termed the EIA study "somewhat theoretical and subject to some
possible limitations," but it did rely on the estimates. See id. at 1785.
54. 1959 Microwave Report 1785; 1960 Microwave Opinion 848.
55. For discussion of the possibility that the Commission's decision may be difficult to
reverse, see text at notes 41-45 .rupra.
56. 1959 Microwave Report 1776, 1788-89; see id. at 1772-76; Testimony of E. J.
Strawn, Vice President, Shell Communications, Inc., Exhibit II, Conclusion, p. 2.
57. 1959 Microwave Report 1788-89.
58. 1960 Microwave Opinion 854; 1959 Microwave Report 1789; cf. id. at 1781-82.
See Letter From the Department of Justice to the Federal Communications Comm'n, Mar.
28, 1957, on file at the FCC (cited and discussed in 1959 Microwave Report 1781).
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larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest." 69 Although the
Commission's opinion did not discuss the impact of competition on carriers'
prices or services, some evidence was introduced indicating that the common
carrier microwave services were either inefficient or overpriced. One company
submitted comparative cost data which showed that the carrier's rental charge
for a ten year period would be more than three times the cost of purchase, in-
stallation, and repair.60 Presumably, therefore, competition with private owner-
ship might also lead to improved performance in this area.01
The Commission's emphasis on the beneficial effects of competition might be
interpreted broadly as a partial renunciation of the regulatory philosophy em-
bodied in Title II. The powers given the Commission under Title II suggest
that detailed governmental regulation is the proper means for securing an
acceptable standard of performance from communications common carriers.
0 2
Traditionally, protection from competition has been viewed as a necessary
corollary of such regulation 6 3 In fact, however, the common carriers have
never been free from some competition, for the Commission has never guar-
anteed them freedom from each other's competition. 4 The Microwave Report
represents a closer look at this competition-free premise, and it seems to con-
clude not only that competition need not be harmful, but that it can perform
certain regulatory functions itself. Although the Commission's opinion articu-
59. Communications Act, § 303(g), 48 Stat. 1082 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1958).
60. Testimony of E. J. Strawn, Vice President, Shell Communications, Inc., Ex-
hibit II. This shows that a common carrier's estimate of charges for a particular system
with no expansion contemplated were $84,360 yearly, while the private company estimated
that it could install its own comparable system at a cost of $114,023 and it would have a
yearly maintenance cost of $12,000. Id. at Exhibit 6a. See Television Intercity Relay Sta-
tions, 17 P. & F. RADIO REG. 1621 (1958) ; Network Broadcasting, H.R. REP. No. 1297, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1958) ; Celler, Antitrust Problems in the Television Broadcasting
Industry, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 549, 554 (1957); Salant, Fisher & Brooks, The
Functions and Practices of a Television Network, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PRons. 584, 589
(1957).
61. There are indications that A.T. & T. has already moved to meet the challenge of
private microwave systems. It has created a new service it calls "Telpak" which enables
those needing a large volume of point-to-point communication to obtain approximately
twice as much service between two specified points without an increase in cost. Press Re-
lease of American Telephone & Telegraph Co., January 16, 1961.
62. The Commission is given broad powers over such things as rates, quality of ser-
vice, and extension of facilities. Communications Act, §§ 201-05, 214, 48 Stat. 1070 (1934),
as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-05, 214 (1958).
63. See notes 9, 11 supra and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Martin J. Nunn, 7 P. & F. RADIO REG. 844 (1951); see Courtney &
Blooston, Development of Mobile Radio Communications-The "Work-Horse" Radio
Services, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 626, 638-42 (1957).
The argument that "public utilities" should be free from competition has frequently
failed. See, e.g., Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 139 (1939) ; Sheridan-
Wyoming Coal Co. v. Krug, 168 F2d 557, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; Porto Rico Ry., Light &
Power Co. v. Colom, 106 F.2d 345, 351 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 617 (1939) ; 43
Am. Jua. Public Utilities and Services § 18, at 582 (1942).
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lates only the effect of stimulating research and development, it might be logi-
cally extended to recognize the probable effect of improving operating efficiency
and of lowering the cost to the consumer. Thus, far from being inconsistent
with the concept of regulation by government, competition may indeed com-
plement it.05
65. For judicial recognition of this tenet, see, e.g., Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. United
States, 361 U.S. 173, 186-88 (1959) ; McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67,
85-87 (1944) ; Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
